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Abstract
We estimate a model of labor supply and participation in multiple programs for UK lone
mothers which exploits a reform of in-work transfers. Cash entitlements increased but
eligibility to in-kind child nutrition programs was lost. We find that in-work cash and in-
work in-kind transfers both have large positive labor supply effects. There is, however, a
utility loss from program participation which is estimated to be larger for cash than for
child nutrition. This implies that the partial cash out of the in-kind benefits reduced labor
supply.
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of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationary Office by the ESRC Data Archive. We would like to thank
Richard Blundell, Gauthier Lanot, and participants at the 2008 TAPES conference, especially David
Neumark and Martin Feldstein for their insightful comments. Stuart Adam of the Institute for Fiscal Studies
provided detailed advice on the evolution of the UK welfare system. Our tax-benefit routines were
developed in conjunction with the IFS and we are indebted to many of their staff. The usual disclaimer
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1. Introduction
In-kind transfers are widespread and extensive. A recent survey (Currie and
Gahvari (2008)) shows that the proportion of US welfare that is in-kind, as opposed to
cash, has increased over time. Indeed, even abstracting from the rise in in-kind medical
programs, the share of in-kind support has tended to increase. In 2002 Food Stamps, the
School Lunch and Breakfast programs, and WIC (Supplemental Nutrition Program for
Women, Infants and Children) alone accounted for over 0.33% of GDP.
Health, housing, childcare, education, and nutrition are commonly the subject of
in-kind transfers. In some cases such transfers are targeted on low income and/or high
need households; either directly through means-testing or, indirectly, through ensuring
that self-selection occurs. In the UK, the most important means-tested in-kind transfer
programs are housing subsidies for the poor, costing around 1.5% of GNP, and the two
principal food transfer programs for low income households with children, costing a
further 0.6%
1. The self-targeting property of in-kind transfers, such that only the poor
participate, has been one popular argument made in their support but this does not carry
much weight in developed countries where income is relatively easy to observe. Indeed,
there are few examples of in-kind transfers in developed economies that rely entirely on
self-selection – most impose eligibility conditions, often related to income and/or needs.
There is extensive evidence on the labor supply effects of cash transfer programs
2 but
very little that addresses the effects of in-kind transfers.
Cash transfer programs are often supplemented by in-kind transfers. The
expansion of the principal US in-work transfer program, Earned Income Tax Credit
1 Very recently the UK has seen the introduction of some universal free childcare provision, and some
means-tested support for childcare expenditures. Neither program has had its labor supply effects analyzed.
2 See Brewer et al (2008) for a recent overview for the UK, and Moffitt (1992) provides an extensive
review of US research which is updated in Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001). Scholz (1996), for example,
discusses the EITC expansion and implications for incentives.3
(EITC), has been accompanied by the growth of in-kind transfers such as food stamps and
medical cover for both the working and non-working poor. The UK has similar in-work,
out-of-work, and in-kind transfer programs to the US and has experienced similar
expansions of its principal in-work cash transfer program (now known as Working Tax
Credit in the UK) but the expansion of this UK program was, in part, financed from
removing in-kind entitlements. In contrast to the tendency for the US to expand in-kind
provision, a UK reform in 1988 implied that low income working households with
children experienced a rise in cash transfer entitlement but a loss of eligibility to in-kind
transfers
3. There was effectively a partial cash-out of in-kind transfers in 1998 for low
income families with a working parent. However, in-kind transfers are again on the UK
policy agenda and the welfare milk program that we analyze here has recently been
expanded to include fruit and vegetables.
The objective of the paper is to measure the effect of in-kind transfers relative to
cash by exploiting the observed variation in labor supply of lone mothers in pooled cross-
section survey data. This paper exploits the 1988 reform to estimate a structural labor
supply model which allows for endogenous multiple welfare program participation and
we focus on the relative labor supply responses to cash and in-kind transfers. The model
considers the effect on the labor supplies of a sample of lone mothers of the UK’s Family
Credit in-work cash transfer program (the precursor to Working Tax Credit), the out-of-
work transfer program known as Income Support (roughly corresponding to the US
TANF program), as well as the three principal in-kind programs for low income
3 Slesnick (1996) shows that the US the expansion of in-kind transfers for those out of work has been a
major factor in protecting the living standards of the poor despite a fall in real cash incomes. The labor
supply effect of the expansion of the UK in-work welfare program has been analyzed in Blundell (2006)
and references therein.4
households: Housing Benefit
4 for those with high housing costs, Welfare Milk Tokens for
families with pre-school age children, and Free School Lunches for children of school
age.
2. Existing Literature
There are at least three difficulties in estimating the impact of transfer programs
on labor supply behavior. First, labor supply and program participation decisions may be
determined simultaneously. For example, if labor supply depends on the net marginal
wage and the net marginal wage depends on whether one participates in a transfer
program. Moreover, the unobservable determinants of labor supply may also affect
program participation giving arise to endogeneity. Secondly, in the context of multiple
transfers, simultaneity arises because participation in any one program depends upon the
level of entitlement, which is itself a function of receipt of other transfers. Thirdly, in the
context of in-kind transfer programs, it may be difficult to place a value on them.
The existing literature on the effects of in-kind transfers on labor supply is sparse,
despite the heavy expenditures that are made on such transfers. Three of the four
published papers that are directly concerned with this issue take a structural approach to
estimation: Fraker and Moffitt (1988) and Keane and Moffitt (1998) investigate single
mothers, while Hagstrom (1996) considers the effects on the labor supplies of married
couples
5. They each adopt discrete choice approaches to labor supply modeling and
assume that in-kind transfers are equivalent to cash. This implicitly assumes that
preferences are separable in labor supply so that the only effect that such transfers have is
4 Housing Benefit is effectively an in-kind benefit in the UK since it is hypothecated to pay rent and in
many cases it pays the rent directly.
5 There are a few UK studies of program participation but these invariably assume that labor supply is
exogenous: an example is Blundell, Fry and Walker (1988). Similarly, existing UK labor supply research on
in-work transfer programs assume that program participation is exogenous to labor supply: an example is
Brewer et al (2008).5
through the income and substitution effects associated with their cash value
6. In such a
separable model, food stamps reduce labor supplies through both their income and
substitution effects.
However, each of these studies allows for non-participation in welfare programs,
including in-kind transfers, in a way which permits the cash value of an in-kind transfer to
have a different effect on labor supply from an equivalent cash transfer. Such structural
modeling makes explicit assumptions about the nature of preferences and identifies
preference parameters from variations in budget constraints across households. Fraker
and Moffitt (1988) use SIPP data to estimate a trivariate ordered probit model for discrete
(ordered 3-state) labor supply, AFDC and Food Stamp program participation. Labor
supply is estimated conditional on program participation and, although endogeneity is
allowed for, separability between program participation and labor supply is assumed. In
Keane and Moffitt (1998) AFDC, Food Stamps and housing subsidies are modeled as a
trivariate probit simultaneously with a discrete choice (ordered 3-state probit) for labor
supply.
One drawback of these papers is that they assume that if part-time work is
preferred to non-participation, then so too is full-time work and therefore utility
comparisons are not made between all alternatives. The validity of this depends upon the
budget constraint being convex, which is invariably not the case for US (or UK) lone
mothers. Hagstrom (1996) also uses SIPP data and consider a nested multinomial logit
discrete model of labor supply with wives’ discrete choices (unordered 3-state)
conditional on husbands’ (unordered 3-state) choices, and participation in food stamps
6 There are very few studies that investigate the extent to which preferences between labor supply and
consumption goods are separable. Blundell and Walker (1982) decisively reject the assumption of weak
separability in their work on married couples drawn from earlier cross-sections of the same data source that
is used here. Currie and Gahvari (2008) emphasise the possibility that in-kind transfers could increase labor
supply to the extent that they are complementary – for example, childcare subsidies.6
conditional on both labor supplies
7. Separability is still assumed and the unpalatable
assumption with standard multinomial logit models of the independence of irrelevant
alternatives is circumvented by allowing nesting. However, the ordering of the nesting is
not innocent in this context, since food stamps are conditioned on wife labor supply
which is, in turn, conditioned on husband labor supply. While this frees up the correlation
structure somewhat, the assumed ordering of the nesting is arbitrary and implies that the
correlations are not entirely unrestricted
8.
All three of these structural papers
9 conclude that food stamps have small and
insignificant negative effects on labor supplies
10. In contrast, a recent fourth paper, by
Hoynes and Schnanzenbach (2007), exploits the staggered introduction of the US food
stamp program across counties and uses the PSID and pooled Census data to estimate its
effect using a difference in differences methodology
11. The paper is careful to consider
the possibilities that the food stamp roll-out interacted with an earlier program. The PSID
allows the effects on hours of work and participation to be estimated and they find
economically large, but statistically insignificant, negative effects. A limitation of the
Census data is that it only permits the analysis of the probabilities of labor force
participation and family income exceeding $10,000, and they find economically small,
but statistically significant, negative effects..
7 Married couples are assumed not to be entitled to AFDC. In contrast, Hoynes (1996) focuses on the AFDC
Unemployed Parents program.
8 Train (2003) provides extensive details of the implications of IIA and tests for it.
9 A further example is Brewer et al (2007) who estimate a structural model of labor supply together with
program participation, but they ignore in-kind transfers. For identification, they rely on a 1999 change of
Family Credit, whereas our paper exploits the 1988 reform. In 1999 FC was expanded considerably and its
administration was changed. Importantly, they show that the stigma associated with FC fell and, together
with higher entitlements, this generated a large increase in labor force participation.
10 Along with almost all of the labour supply literature we assume that fertility and marital status are
exogenous. Evidence on how responsive these are to welfare is mixed. See, for example, Joyce et al (2002)
on fertility and Bitler et al (2004) on marital status.
11 Fischer (2000) is an additional labor supply study which is concerned with US housing subsidies. He
shows that they have large negative effects.7
Our paper lies somewhere between the difference in differences and purely
structural approaches. We adopt structural assumptions on preferences to allow us to
simulate the effects of a complex reform and to break down its effects into those due to
changes in cash program entitlements and changes to in-kind program eligibility rules.
The benefit of adopting a structural approach is that we can learn more – once we have
estimated preference parameters we can use those parameters to simulate the effect of
other changes that may be of interest. Of course, the cost is that we adopt possibly
restrictive assumptions
12.
3. Transfer Programs in the UK
The nature of the UK welfare system relevant to the labor supply of lone mothers
is well documented elsewhere
13 so only a brief review that highlights the main features is
presented here. An important reform to the structure of UK transfer programs occurred in
1988. Income Support (IS, known as Supplementary Benefit before the 1988 reform) is
cash and is the UK equivalent to the US TANF. This is intended to ensure that household
incomes do not fall below some minimum. For lone parents eligibility to IS does not
require them to be available or searching for work. Entitlement depends on the number
and ages of children and it imposes a 100% implicit tax rate on all sources of household
income above some minimal level. Housing Benefit (HB) covers a proportion of the rent
and rates (a local property tax) for households not in receipt of IS where the proportion
12 One of the in-kind transfers (free school lunches) that we analyze has a seasonal element to it (it is only
available during school terms) and the seasonal pattern has a regional dimension to it (school terms are
different in Scotland relative to England and Wales). However, it seems unlikely that labor supply would
vary in response to the short-run variations in the availability of free school lunches arising from school
holiday periods. Thus, we do not feel that it is sensible to try to exploit this source of variation within a
difference-in-differences framework.
13 See for example Duncan and Giles (1996) and references therein. In our analysis we incorporate all
welfare program entitlements (as well as income tax and social security contributions) into the budget
constraints. Indeed all combinations of program participation are considered, and we shall describe only
those in detail that are of direct interest for the current application.8
depends on income - making it effectively a means-tested in-work transfer
14. Family
Credit
15 (FC) is payable to low income families but only if hours of work exceed some
level - it is means-tested and is explicitly an in-work cash benefit. The main means-tested
in-kind transfers are to low income households with children. Free School Lunches are an
in-kind transfer equivalent of US National School Lunch Program. Welfare Milk Tokens
are an in-kind transfer to households with pre-school children and are similar to the US
Food Stamp program
16. Hereafter the Free School Lunch and Welfare Milk Token
programs are together denoted in-kind transfers to households with children (CH).
Welfare Milk Tokens were available for each child under age 5, and could be
exchanged for 7 pints
17 of liquid milk per week. Free School Lunches were available for
each school-aged child during school days.
While Income Support has an unambiguously negative effect on work incentives,
FC exhibits a notch in the budget constraint which increases the probability of working
(although, because FC is means tested, it may act as a disincentive to working long
hours). Prior to the 1988 reform both IS and FC recipients were eligible for CH, but since
1988 only IS participants have been entitled: FC participants receive cash but no CH.
Prior to 1988 those on FC were also eligible for the CH. The 1988 reform also involved
an expansion of FC so that entitlement levels were higher. In effect, in 1988 there was a
partial cash-out of CH for those with low incomes in work. This makes participation in
14 Income Support contains an element to cover housing costs which is as least as generous as the
provisions of Housing Benefit. For example Income Support will cover certain mortgage interest payments
while HB does not.
15 FC was originally referred to as Family Income Supplement from 1973-1988, from 1988-1999 it was
reformed and called Family Credit. It was expanded in 1999 and re-named Working Families’ Tax Credit
until 2003 when it was split into Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit. We are only concerned with the
period around the 1988 reform and will use the term Family Credit throughout.
16 See Currie (1996) for an exhaustive review of US in-kind transfers. Moffitt (1989) uses the Puerto Rico
Food Stamp cash-out as a natural experiment to estimate the value of an in-kind transfer directly.
17 Imperial pints contain 20 fluid ounces (568ml), compared to 16 for US pints (473 ml).9
the CH programs important to the work participation decision post-reform, whereas pre-
reform CH was also important for the hours of work choice conditional upon
participation. Essentially a budget constraint notch (a discontinuity equal to the value of
the CH) has moved back from the point where FC exhaustion occurred to the point where
IS runs out.
To clarify the way in which IS, FC, and CH might affect labor supply, Figure 1
shows a characterization of a possible budget constraint. We assume, for simplicity of
illustration, that there is no HB entitlement (i.e. this individual lives rent free or in owner
occupied accommodation) and we ignore income taxation and social security
contributions. The dashed line from the origin represents the budget constraint in the
absence of the welfare programs, with slope equal to the wage rate. The black bold line
A-B-C-D-E-F is the budget constraint with cash transfers pre-reform. A-B is the level of
Income Support entitlement at zero hours of work. B-C is flat because Income Support is
means-tested with a withdrawal rate of 100%. When hours reach 24, Family Credit
becomes payable with an entitlement given by the vertical distance C-D. As hours and
earnings increase, Family Credit is withdrawn at 70% along D-E. Entitlement is
exhausted at point E. E-F is beyond the welfare system. Free School Lunches and Milk
Tokens are associated with both Income Support and Family Credit and the monetary
value of these are denoted by dashed-dotted lines.
The reform affects both cash and in-kind transfers from 24 hours of work. The
cash transfer budget line is denoted A-B-C-D’-E’-F. Changes to the cash budget line are
colored green. Family Credit became somewhat more generous as denoted by C-D’, and
was withdrawn at 50% along D’-E’
18. Crucially, in-kind transfers were lost for those on
18 The 70% taper under the pre-reform FC system was based on gross income, while the 50% taper under
the post-reform system was based on income net of tax and social security.10
Family Credit. The monetary of this loss is denoted by the red colored dashed-dotted line.
In-kind transfers are now only associated with Income Support and monetary value of this
is unchanged and denoted by the black dashed-dotted lines Of course, in practice,
Housing Benefit, income tax and social security contribution systems overlay this figure
which causes additional complexities that we ignore in this stylized diagram. However
the figure conveys the essential two elements of the in-work reform: an increase in cash
generosity and the loss of in-kind transfers.
There are no official figures for CH program participation. Official figures based
on FES data (see Department of Social Security (1991)) for lone parent FC program
participation in 1987 are not available although the total figure for couples and lone
parents was 51% of eligible cases (so-called, caseload take-up). Earlier unofficial figures
in Fry and Stark (1993) are similar. Subsequent official statistics were based on the FES
data pooled over successive years and the figure for 1990/91 (1991/1992) is 62% (66%)..
Comparable 1987 figures for HB and IS are 69% and 95% respectively. Clearly HB and
FC have a more serious "take-up" problem than IS, and this motivates our approach of
modeling FC and HB take-up but assuming IS entitlements are received..
Family Credit was a welfare program and not part of the income tax system
19.
Claiming FC involved completing a (long and detailed) form every 6 months and
verifying earnings by producing three consecutive monthly (or seven weekly) pay slips.
Employers were contacted to verify that applicants met the minimum hours condition if
that was not apparent from the pay slips
20. Asset information was also required but, at
least for lone parents, this usually involved no more than stating that one did not have
19 Family Credit was subsequently replaced by Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) in October 1999.
One way in which WFTC differed from FC was that, in most cases, it was to be delivered via employers in
the pay cheque. A second difference was that WFTC was administered by the tax, not the welfare,
authorities.
20 Our sample period pre-dates the 1999 introduction of the UK national minimum wage.11
assets which exceeded a large value. Housing Benefit was complicated because it was
administered by local government offices rather than the welfare authorities, each with
slightly different claim procedures and forms. Invariably the level of rent had to be
verified but tenants usually had “rent books” or tenancy agreements that would serve this
purpose. New applications had to be made whenever circumstances changed. Income
Support usually involved an interview at a local office of the Social Security Department,
where applicants were asked about their detailed circumstances and expected to produce
substantiating documentation.
In contrast, in-kind transfers required that applicants only complete a short form
detailing the number and ages of their children and verify that they were in receipt of
Income Support (or also Family Credit prior to the 1988 reform). Income Support for
lone mothers did not require that they were “available for work” so, unlike the case of
long term unemployed, there was no requirement to “sign-on” (periodically declare that
one was available for work) at the local office of the government Department for
Employment. Income Support, Family Credit and Housing Benefit, at the time, was paid
directly into a bank account or, for those without an account, by mailing a “giro cheque”
that could be cashed at Post Offices
21
Welfare Milk Tokens were small colored plastic disks which could be exchanged
in shops, or with doorstep delivery services, and sellers were then reimbursed by the
Department of Health. They were eventually replaced by books of vouchers. Over this
21 In the case of those living in social housing, which was still common in the early 1990’s, HB may have
been paid directly to the local government since they also acted as the landlord.12
period, schools maintained a list of Free School Lunch eligible children, and would issue
them with tickets each week. Ineligible children had to buy their tickets weekly
22.
The major distinguishing feature of claiming cash program entitlements is the
high costs of claiming, compared to the low marginal costs of claiming an associated in-
kind transfer. Moreover, it seems likely that in the majority of cases the only agents who
knew that individuals were receiving cash transfers were the recipients themselves and
government officials, while knowledge of in-kind transfer receipt was potentially shared
with local shop assistants and peers at school. It seems likely that non-participation in the
cash programs by those who were eligible was largely driven by imperfect information
and the transaction costs of claiming, while it seems likely that in-kind transfers may have
low value for the user to exchange, perhaps because of stigma, but have relatively low
information/transaction costs for the claimant. Of course, in the absence of identifying
information on factors that might affect take-up but not labor supply, such as
experimental, or at least local, variation in claiming costs, identifying the causes of non-
participation is problematic.
4. Family Expenditure Survey Data
Our data consist of 15 pooled cross-sections of Family Expenditure Surveys from
April 1978 to March 1992
23. In order to abstract from intra-household distributional
issues we select a sample of lone mothers who are householders which yields 4527
22 Storey and Chamberlin (2001) provide details of qualitative research that is directed towards improving
take-up of Free School Lunches, such as ensuring that the free and paid-for tickets are indistinguishable and
that a separate queue for lunch is not imposed on the recipients of free tickets.
23 It is difficult to use data prior to 1978 because of the absence of schooling information, used in the
estimation of wage equations, and data beyond 1992 does not contain appropriate information about
housing costs to deal with changes in the local tax system that occurred at this time. Moreover, from April
1992 the minimum hours requirement for FC was reduced to 16. We restrict our attention to the period
before April 1992 to avoid this complication.13
observations
24. We compute eligibility and the level of entitlement from a very detailed
routine that acknowledges all relevant features of the tax, welfare and social security
contribution systems including in-kind transfers
25. The labor supply data is usual weekly
hours and relates to the survey week. We divide the observed data into groups according
to weekly hours of work as: unemployed (UE), defined as usual hours are zero and
economic position is coded as "searching for work"; non-participants (NP), defined as
having hours less than 10 and not searching for work; lower part time (LPT) defined, as
hours ranging from 10 to 19; higher part time (HPT), with hours from 20 to 29, and full
time (FT), defined as hours 30+. Table 1 shows some summary statistics broken down by
labor supply status and pre/post reform. Figure 2 shows the usual weekly hours of work
distributions (in 4-hour bin widths) both before and after the 1988 reform. There is an
increase in zero hours, largely at the expense of full time work. Hourly data (not shown)
exhibits reporting modes at multiples of 10 and 5 hours, and there is a pronounced spike
at 24 which is the minimum hours of work requirement for receiving FC
2627.
24 We exclude households containing multiple “benefit units” in order to focus on a more homogeneous
sample of lone mothers making independent labour supply and program participation decisions.
25 The routine is based on the Institute for Fiscal Studies’ TAXBEN computer program but deals with all of
the changes that have taken place between 1978 and 1992. See Johnson, Stark and Webb (1990) for details
of TAXBEN. Moreover, we allow for wages to be determined differently across employment states because
of the large differential between part-time and full-time wages rates that is a feature of the UK labor market
(see Ermisch and Wright (1991)).
26 Saez (1999) shows that bunching at kinks in the budget constraint can easily become less apparent with
even modest amounts of measurement error.
27 Subsequent to our data, the minimum hours level for entitlement to FC fell from 24 to 16 (from April
1992), and from July 1995 a further notch in the budget constraint was introduced when a £10 addition to
FC entitlement was added for those working 30 hours of more, but these are outside the period of our data.
In principle, we could treat the April-December 1992 data as a hold-out sample and use our estimates to
compare the predicted consequences of the reduction in the hours requirement with actual behavior.
However, the reform was implemented when cases renewed so it would not be until October 1992 that all
cases would face the new hours minimum and this would leave us with 90 observations.14
Program participation is summarized in Table 2 where the data is divided
according to our definition of labor force status
28. The table uses actual observed weekly
income and hours worked data to compute eligibility. The participation rates ("take-up"
rate of entitlements) are computed to be 45.4% for FC, 58.4% for Housing Benefit and
85.6% for CH. These figures are somewhat lower than official rates because the official
methodology includes “pipeline” cases, estimated from administrative data, in the
numerator.
As is to be expected there are significant numbers of participants who are
apparently ineligible. In the case of FC these arise because there is no requirement to
report changes in circumstances once eligibility is established (on the basis of 3 months or
7 weeks worth of documented income and hours), and eligibility lasts for 6 months before
it needs to be re-assessed
29. For CH there is some local authority discretion in the
provision of nutrition transfers to children at school and disabled children may be eligible
but we cannot observe this in our data
30. HB has the largest proportion of ineligible
participants. Fry and Stark (1993) point out that this is largely because of payments of
arrears for those who may not be entitled on the basis of current circumstances.
The importance of observed multiple transfer receipt (ignoring calculated
entitlement) is shown in Table 3. The sample proportions receiving 3, 2, 1 and 0 transfers
are respectively 1.6, 6.3, 66.7 and 25.4%. While the data appears to be dominated by
individuals receiving just a single transfer this is because of the low level of labor market
28 The sensitivity of the labor supply model estimates to the hours grouping was tested. Parameters were not
significantly affected by altering the LPT and HPT criteria, until HPT reaches 35 hours, which brings the
FT hours peak into HPT
29 This property generates incentives for inter-temporal substitution that can cause ineligible participation.
Moreover, there is no requirement to report changes in circumstances that affect eligibility.
30 We allow for non-receipt of CH associated with school summer vacations. Other vacations are difficult to
time. However, observations report receipt of CH over two consecutive weeks and it is extremely unlikely
that this survey period would exactly coincide with a two week school vacation break. We count a
household as a participating in CH if there are any free school meals reported in a two week period.15
participation (we would expect to find multiple transfer receipt for those in-work).
Sample proportions entitled to multiple transfers are much higher
31. The 40 cells in Table
3 each correspond to a term in the likelihood in our econometric analysis in Section 5
5. Econometric Framework
The budget constraints faced by UK lone mothers are likely to take complicated
piecewise-linear forms with several important non-convexities, as illustrated in Figure 1
in the previous section
32. We follow much of the literature on modeling the labor supply
of low income households and approximate continuous hours by a choice among discrete
alternatives
33. Recent labor supply work, for example by Keane and Moffitt (1998),
Hoynes (1996), and Brewer et al (2007) takes the discrete choice approach. The first uses
an ordered probit Random Utility Model. The drawback of this approach is that scaling it
up to handle a large number of choices requires moving to simulation based estimation
methods because of the complexity of the integration involved. In contrast, the second
and third papers treat choices as a multinomial logit where the number of choices is
effectively irrelevant to the computational complexity. The drawback here is that the
multinomial logit imposes the restriction that preferences must satisfy the independence
of irrelevant alteratives property. However, Hoynes (1996) and later work relax this
restriction by allowing for an additive stochastic term to the utility associated with each
31 IS receipt is not included in Table 3. Consequently multiple receipts are understated, for example, 80% of
CH recipients also receive IS.
32 One non-convexity is due to the FC notch at 24 hours interacting with the 100% tax faced by those on IS.
More non-convexities arise from FC and HB eligibility ceasing as earnings rise. Withdrawal of CH creates
a notch where IS ends post 1988, and where FC ended prior to 1988. A notch exists at the lower earnings
limit for social security contributions.
33 The use of discrete choice modeling for labor supply problems has a long history. Zabalza, Pissarides and
Barton (1980) characterize the choice over retirement, part-time or full-time work as an ordered probit with
random parameters for a sample of older people. They can do this because their sample exhibit kinked but
convex budget sets. Moffitt (1984) estimates a discrete choice model where there is gross wage endogeneity
which is modeled as a quadratic relationship between wages and hours. Fraker and Moffitt (1988) is an
example that includes in-kind tranfers (Food Stamps).16
choice. Hoynes (1996) considers participation in a single program (AFDC-UP) together
with husband and wife discrete choice labor supply. This is a model of labor supply and
cash program participation, and still represents the state-of-the art in the literature. The
econometric framework is a multinomial logit with hours approximation error which is
integrated out together with finite mixing. This is an unordered choice framework which
does not impose independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Furthermore there is no
need to assume separability between labor supply and program participation. Brewer et al
(2006) also follows the multinomial logit approach and also avoids the independendence
of irrelevant alternatives by allowing unobserved heterogeneity to enter in a number of
ways – through program participation costs, and unobservable costs of labor market
participation as well as random parameters.
Like Hoynes and Brewer et al, we allow for unordered labor supply choices, but
we do not adopt the logit with mixing to avoid IIA but rather use a multinomial probit.
That is, like Keane and Moffitt (1998), we adopt a probit specification but we do not
restrict it to be ordered.. Like Hoynes and Brewer et al, we also allow for unobserved
heterogeneity through random parameters. While our approach would not scale up to a
larger choice set with the same ease as those based on a multinomial logit framework, it
has the same degree of flexibility.
It is useful to summarize the restrictions we have put on the labor supply and
program participation model so as to place these in the context of the literature. We
assume that program participation is a function of demographics and income from the
program. This function does not vary across labor market states, demographics do not
vary across state, only program income varies. Hence we obtain a program participation
index which varies across labor market state according to this function of entitlement.
Exploiting the nature of the choice set and restricting program participation functions17
makes the problem a much more tractable without imposing further restrictions on
preferences or functional form. For example, FC eligibility is restricted to those in work
and CH is restricted to Income Support recipients and only to FC recipients pre-reform.
McFadden (1984) surveys the discrete response literature and motivates a choice
of modeling framework appropriate to the present context following Hausman and Wise
(1978). That is, we estimate an unordered Probit Random Utility Model over labor
supply states and participation in transfer programs. Furthermore, we control for the fact
that some of those not working would rather be employed – i.e. are involuntarily
unemployed
34. These choices are determined by, among other things, the income levels
associated with each state. Since we only observe the one alternative that is chosen, we
need to predict incomes for each state from the income in the observed state. However, it
would be computationally demanding to estimate the wages associated with each labor
market alternative jointly with the choice among alternatives
35. But since we only require
consistent predictions of wages in order to estimate the determinants of each state, we
adopt a two-step procedure. In the first step we estimate full-time and part-time wage
equations which use a reduced form for labor market status to control for the endogeneity
of hours and use these estimates to predict incomes in the part-time and full-time
positions
36. Income for non-participants is computed from the welfare system and
34 This seems particularly important since our data covers a period when there was widespread
unemployment.
35 Modelling wages and choices jointly is impractical since each evaluation of the likelihood would require
a pass through the tax-benefit code. Our budget constraint is highly non-convex and this would be
computationally demanding.
36 MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990) show that inconsistent estimates may result from using predicted
gross wages in a non-linear second stage labor supply equation. One solution is to integrate out the
prediction error in the wage equations, at the cost of increasing the dimensionality of the estimation
problem. Van Soest (1995) does this for the Netherlands, on top of a simpler logit structure, and finds labor
supply elasticities to be unchanged. However, in view of the complex, highly non-linear nature of the UK
tax-benefit system we regard the errors in predicting wages to be of second order importance.18
observed unearned (non-transfer) income. In the second step, we estimate the random
utility model using the predicted incomes in each state
37.
The budget constraint is approximated by just four discrete labor supply
alternatives: non-participation (NP), low hours part-time (LPT), high hours part-time
(HPT) and full-time (FT)
38; in combination with three transfer programs: Family Credit
(FC), Housing Benefit (HB) and in-kind transfers to children (CH). So individuals face at
most (5*8=) 40 possible alternatives (4 labor supply states plus unemployment and 3
binary transfer program combinations). The choices between these alternatives are driven
by differences in the utilities attached to them. To be consistent with choice theory
implies determining all 31 utility differences (8 alternatives involve unemployment which
we do not regard as a distinct choice).
We are able to reduce the dimension of the problem by taking advantage of some
of the restrictions inherent in the structure of the model. Let p index each program in the
set of programs P={HB, FC, CH}. Participation in each separate program is indicated T
p,
which together compose the complete program participation vector   , ,
p HB FC IK
s T T T   Τ .
Hence participation in programs
p
s Τ and labor supply hs completely characterize a state,
s. Let the utility associated with choosing state s be  
* 0, , , ;
p p
is is is is U y h y T X where
p
is y is the
income associated with the programs P, is
0
is y is other (i.e. non-transfer) income, hs is
hours,
p
s Τ is the program participation vector associated with this alternative, and X is a
vector of individual characteristics.
37 In common with the program participation literature, we do not take into account errors in classification
which may arise through miss-measurement of transfer receipt or errors in calculating eligibility. We appeal
to our good match with aggregate data and our adoption of best practice entitlement calculations to support
this omission. See Poterba and Summers (1995) for a treatment of errors in classification in the context of
unemployment transitions. .
38 We compute their incomes at 6, 16, 26, and 36 hours.19
Now consider a statistical specification which allows for random variation in
behavior due to an additive disturbance and variation in tastes,  
* 0, , , ; ,
p p
is is is is is U y h  y T X ,
where
*
is U is unobservable utility of state s for individual i, εis is an alternative specific
random error term. Thus, the utility gain of moving from alternative s to t is:
(1)    
* * * 0 * 0 , , , ; , , , , ; ,
p p p p
is it is is is is is it it it it it U U U y h U y h      y T X y T X
In a discrete choice model the set of alternatives is assumed to be common across
individuals. We assume that labor supply is a function (which is allowed to vary across
hours) of individual characteristics (which are fixed irrespective of hours), and a function
(which is fixed across hours, but varies across programs) of characteristics of alternative
combinations of programs and hours (which vary across hours and programs). In other
words, labor supply is a function of individual-specific characteristics and alternative-
specific characteristics. In particular, hours comparisons are a function of demographics
and incomes. The utility difference between labor supply states can be expressed as
(2)    
* *
is it is it i i st is it U U y y X         g ψ ω
where  
0 , , ,
HB FC IK       ψ , with i i       ,   is it y y  g is assumed to be linear,
and  
0 , , ,
HB FC IK       ψ with
p p p
i i       is a matrix of functions of differences
in net incomes (from transfer programs
p
is y and non-program sources
0
is y ). The choice of
g(.) is arbitrary. Brewer et al (2006) use a quadratic utility function in their analysis of
the successor program to Family Credit, but here we find that a linear local approximation
can be accepted.  reflects the mean tastes of the sample while i   is a coefficient which
shows how i differs from the mean individual, and   is it    is an additive disturbance20
assumed to be iid across i but not necessarily across s
39. is  could represent unobserved
attributes of alternatives or individuals which affect choices but, by assumption, are
uncorrelated with i   . The is  does not in itself capture variation in tastes. The
appropriate way to model differing tastes among individuals with identical observables is
to estimate a taste variance parameter, i   40.
As usual in this class of model, only the utility differences between the number of
alternatives minus one can be identified. It is possible to interpret the parameters st ω as a
gain (or a loss) in utility from having the characteristics X when one compares the
alternative s to the alternative t, where the latter choice is the reference.
To summarize, from equation (2), the probability of observing i in labor market
state s is given by
(3)    
* * Pr Pr is it is it i i st is it U U y y X s t                   g ψ ω
Program participation is assumed to be a function (which does not vary across hours) of
individual and program characteristics: specifically, demographic variables and the levels
of entitlement. Consequently program participation can vary with labor market state, as
does entitlement and eligibility. In particular, an individual i, in labor market state s will
take-up transfer p if it offers a utility gain. This is assumed to be determined by the
following latent and observed program participation (take-up) equations:
(4)
* 1if + + >0 and >0
, ,
0 otherwise
p p p p p p p
p is i is is is
is
T Y E
T p HB FC IK
    
   

V
39 Hausman and Wise (1978) assume  is it    to be iid across alternatives too.
40 Fischer and Nagin (1981) show that failure to incorporate this taste variation induces a downward bias to
estimates of taste parameters. Demographics could also be included in the variance term, but in the absence
of strong priors guiding what ought to be included, this is not pursued.21
where
* p
is T is the latent variable corresponding to observed take-up
p
is T of a transfer
program p, which we define to be unity if i is observed to be participating in the program
and zero otherwise;
p
i V is a vector of individual characteristics which do not vary across
labor market states;
p  is a corresponding vector of parameters;
p
is Y is transfer
entitlement which may vary across labor market states;
p  is an associated coefficient
and
p
is  is a random error. Observed program participation is zero if entitlement,
p
is E =0.
The relationship between labor supply and program participation is established
through the income function g(.,.). Hours comparisons are made on the basis of income
differences, amongst other things. These differences are decomposed into HB, FC, CH
and other income differences separately. Other income is differenced directly, whereas
the differences in program incomes are the differences in the program participation
indices, which are, in turn, a function of entitlement levels. It is straightforward to show
that when comparing labor market states s and t, the difference in program participation
indices between states turns out to be a function of entitlement differences only. That is,
(5)    
* * +
p p p p p p p
is it is it is it T T Y Y       
It is evident from equation (5) that
* p
is T has the dimension of income, and can be
interpreted accordingly. Restricting program participation to be a function of size of
benefits allows only for “variable cost stigma” in the terminology of Moffitt (1983). This
is relaxed by allowing take-up to also be a function of individual demographic
characteristics, thus further incorporating “fixed cost stigma”.22
Our model does not require that we impose additive separability between labor
supply and program participation
41. Indeed, imposing the restriction 0
p   allows a
direct test of separability between labor supply and participation in each program p.
Furthermore,
p
i   allows taste heterogeneity to vary across types of income.
It is useful to summarize the restrictions we have put on the labor supply and
program participation model so as to place these in the context of the literature. We
assume that program participation is a function of demographics and income from the
program. This function does not vary across labor market states, demographics do not
vary across state, only program income varies. Hence we obtain a program participation
index which varies across labor market state according to this function of entitlement.
Exploiting the nature of the choice set and restricting program participation functions
makes the problem a much more tractable (4 labor market alternatives, unemployment
and 3 programs) 7-equation system
42.
The relationship between labor supply and program participation comes through
differences in incomes and functions of entitlements. We assume multivariate normality
of error terms and allow additional flexibility by estimating random coefficients on
income differences. Hoynes (1996) imposes an even more restrictive logit error structure,
but frees this up by adding heterogeneity terms following Heckman and Singer (1984). A
novelty of our approach is that: we allow taste heterogeneity through random coefficients;
we nest additive separability of labor supply and program participation; but impose only a
41 Non-separability means that program participation directly affects labor market status in addition to its
effect through income levels at each state. Note from Equation (5) that although the terms in individual
characteristics cancel out, the error terms and do not. These terms carry through into the variance of the
labor supply function (see the Appendix).
42 A similar functional restriction is imposed by Keane and Moffitt (1998).23
minimal economic structure on the data. Details concerning stochastic specification,
likelihood contributions and implementation are relegated to the Appendix.
The importance of allowing for involuntary unemployment in a labor supply
model is quite well established in the literature and this seems particularly appropriate for
the period covered by this data. Falsely assuming everyone to be on their labor supply
curve may exaggerate the estimated disincentive effects of the welfare system. The
Family Expenditure Survey data we use asks those with zero hours work in the labor
market whether they are actively looking for a job and we follow Blundell, Ham and
Meghir (1987) and others who use this information to discriminate between voluntary
non-participation and involuntary unemployment
43. This is important because women
who are involuntarily unemployed are not observed to be in their most preferred state,
and must be classified appropriately in a choice model. For the purposes of labor supply
modeling this group is assumed to reveal that some positive hours state is preferred to
zero. Furthermore, individuals observed in any positive hours labor market state are
assumed to prefer their observed state to all alternatives and are not rationed in exercising
this preference. They are distinguished by the following reduced form latent and observed
unemployment rationing equations
(6)










where R* is the latent variable describing the rationing process, and Ri is the observed
outcome, which we define to be unity if i is observed to be not working and searching for
work and zero otherwise. Z is a vector of demand side variables, τ is a corresponding
vector of parameters, and υi is a random error. While this is an extension that has not
43 Allowing labor market rationing does not mean that we rule out fixed costs in the participation decision.
Indeed, Blundell, Ham and Meghir (1998) apply a search theoretic framework to a labor supply model with
job seekers, allowing for fixed costs of work. We do not develop this interpretation here, and assume these
unobserved costs to be part of the choice-specific and ration error terms.24
previously been considered in the labor supply and program participation literature, we
consider it important because we would otherwise understate the extent of program non-
participation. That is, we would assume that non-workers prefer that state to, say, part-
time work with program participation when in fact they simply cannot find a job
44,45. Our
objective is simply to control for potential misclassification with an auxiliary reduced
form rationing function.
The labor supply equations are identified because there are households without
eligibility to transfers at any employment status: largely because they have high wages
and/or unearned (non-transfer) incomes. Labor supply choice itself is distinguished from
unemployment rationing by the exclusion of regional unemployment rate from labor
supply functions. Identification of the determinants of participation in the various
programs is achieved through exogenous variation in eligibilities and entitlements. Time
series variation in real housing costs are extremely important in affecting HB entitlement,
and the variation in real school lunch and milk prices determine the value of CH
entitlements
46. For both FC and CH we rely on the fact that the data spans the reform in
1988: FC entitlements were increased and associated in-kind transfers lost. Thus, our
method relies on both step change associated with the policy reform and the time series
variation in entitlements that using 15 years of data allows.
44 The specification for the determination of wages is log
h h h h
i i i w Z e    for h=PT, FT and where
PT(=LPT+HPT) and FT indicate part-time and full-time labor force status. We estimate the wage equations
by including the Mills Ratios from a Bivariate Probit model of participation vs. non-participation and full-
time vs. part-time work conditional on participation. We include the level of unearned income in the
reduced form labor force status equations but not in the wage equations to achieve identification. Details are
available on request.
45 To reduce the dimensionality of our model we appeal to the results in Blundell, Ham and Meghir (1987)
which tests for the exogeneity of rationing in their double hurdle model of labor supply and finds that their
FES data supports this.
46 We assume, like virtually all of the labor supply literature, that labor supply depends only on prices
through the real wage: milk and food prices do not directly affect labor supply.25
6. Estimates
The model estimates are presented in Table 4. The labor supply and rationing
equations (upper pane) and program participation (lower pane) equations are all estimated
simultaneously. It is convenient to discuss each pane in turn as the nature of the two sets
of dependent variables is different, and consequently the interpretation differs
accordingly.
In the top pane, the labor supply model has two types of explanatory variable:
alternative-specific (income differences) and alternative invariant (demographics). For
income differences we estimate a coefficient mean and variance (indicated in the table by
Random) and for demographics we estimate a coefficient mean (indicated by Fixed) only.
Consider the fixed parameters in the labor supply model. A negative sign implies
that a variable is associated with decreasing the probability of moving to the destination
state. For example, a negative coefficient on Widow in the LPT→NP equation means that
being a widow makes one less likely to prefer NP than LPT. A number of coefficients are
worth remarking on at face value. The presence of young children reduces the FT
probability, and pre-school aged children reduce the probability of working any positive
hours. The coefficients in the HPT→NP equation are not well determined, though they
are significantly different from the corresponding coefficients in the other comparisons
with NP. This suggests that a specification which allows for region and time effects
everywhere may be asking too much of our relatively small part-time sample, though
HPT ought still to be considered a distinct alternative in its own right.
Interpretation of the random parameters on alternative-specific variables is more
direct. This tells us of the impact of the difference in the variable between states on the
probability of being in any state. A positive sign implies that states with larger values of26
the variable are preferred to those with smaller values. The positive coefficient, , on an
income difference implies that more of that income is preferred to less. As well as
estimating the mean of the income difference coefficients, the variance of i   is estimated
to allow for taste heterogeneity.
Income difference coefficients are estimated according to program. Program
income differences arise through differences in
p
i Y across different states, where p is FC,
CH or HB. For CH we use market value of the transfer. Since the level of demographic
variables is alternative-invariant, what remains is a function of transfer entitlement only.
These functions are comparable across programs, and our estimates imply that FC
entitlement has less of a labor supply effect than does CH entitlement, and HB does not
have a significant effect at all on labor supply.
Other (that is Income Support and earned) income enters into the labor supply
function directly. We can put the Y
other coefficient into some perspective by calculating
the implied utility gain associated with an additional pound of other income at 0.0447
(4.474/100). Furthermore, the utility loss associated with working LPT, HPT, FT is 0.92,
1.06, 1.27, which is valued at £20.56 (sd 5.14), £23.69 (sd 1.56), £28.38 (sd 4.47)
respectively on average for the sample
47. This compares with the utility gain from an
extra £1.00 of FC and CH of 0.0222 (= 0.0690 x 0.3223) and 0.0362 (= 0.0748 x 0.4843)
respectively – which, in money terms, is approximately £0.49 and £0.81. We are able to
treat the difference between regular and transfer income as a measure of stigma. Hence
the variable cost stigma of FC participation at mean positive entitlement of £25.10 is
£12.58. Similarly for a mean positive CH entitlement of £7.33, the variable cost stigma
£1.39.
47 These numbers are calculated from the mean of the levels of the indices, and their differences.27
These results suggest the economic model is supported by the data: there is a
utility gain from income, a loss from working and a significant variable cost stigma to
program participation. Further support for the choice of modeling framework is given by
the significant correlations between the unobservables in the choice equations. Significant
random parameters on the income functions support the random utility approach which
accommodates taste heterogeneity.
In the lower pane of Table 4 the program participation results are presented.
Participation in each transfer program is a positive and significant function of entitlement
level. The unrestricted correlation structure which we allow across take-up unobservables
appears to be appropriate. HB unobservables are positively correlated with both FC and
CH. FC and CH are themselves uncorrelated. This is surprising since the former gives rise
to eligibility for the latter in 20% of cases. A possible explanation is that those with IS,
who are mainly out of work, have different unobservable characteristics. This result
suggests that the nature of CH transfers and their take-up is distinctive: perhaps, not
surprising, since the stigma, at least in the case of free school lunches, is directly borne by
the children.
A direct test of separability between program participation and labor supply is a
test of the significance of the program participation indices in the labor supply functions.
These tests indicate that labor supply and program participation per se are non-
separable
48. Non-separability is a feature of FC and CH but not of HB
49.
48 A Lagrange Multiplier test statistic for separability has the following form:
 
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where is the estimated unrestricted parameter vector on which the restriction T
p*=0 is imposed. This has a
value of 188, compared with a 5% critical value of 152, and the associated probability is 0.00023. Hence we
reject separability of programs from labor supply.28
Ideally one would like to be able to evaluate the model by seeing how well it
simulates actual events in the data, such as welfare reforms. Unfortunately, although we
have a reasonably large sample we still rely on post-reform cell sizes that are sometimes
quite small. Thus, there is little prospect for being able to estimate over sub-samples of
the data
50. However, we can see how well the estimates enable us to track the data over
time. Figure 3 illustrates the performance of the model over time. The main feature of the
data is the trend from FT to NP (the omitted category) and the model picks this up quite
well.
A more transparent way to examine the implications of the estimated parameters
is to define a representative individual and simulate the effects of changing some of her
characteristics. Our representative woman has median or modal values for all
characteristics. She has weekly regular income (in 1992 prices) of £105, £115, £130,
£145 at NP, LPT, HPT, FT respectively; has zero eligibility for FC, HB or CH; lives in
rented accommodation; has a youngest child at secondary school (aged 11-18); faces a
local unemployment rate of 5%; and lives in the South East in 1992. The simulation
exercise performed in Table 5 is for program participation response. HB and CH
participation respond most to increasing level of entitlement. FC is only one third as
responsive as HB, despite the same low reference levels.
In a similar way, we simulate labor supply responses in Table 6 for the same
representative individual. That stigma costs have important consequences for labor supply
incentives is clear from comparing the responses to transfer incomes with the response to
other income. That is, comparing the effect of different kinds of incomes on labor market
49 These test statistics have a similar form with (131-2) degrees of freedom. FC, CH and Housing Benefit
have values of 160, 181 and 101. Hence we reject separability for FC and CH only.
50 For example, when we drop the last third of the data and re-estimate only using the pre-reform period,
coefficients on income differences become imprecise. Pre-reform we are relying on real price differences
for housing, food and milk, together with year-to-year entitlement changes. This exercise of splitting the
sample illustrates the importance of the 1988 reform for identification of our model.29
status reveals the relative effects of the stigma or information/transaction costs associated
with different benefits. Other (Income Support and non-transfer) income has the largest
effects: £10 added to income at NP increases the NP probability by almost 6% from 31%,
while £10 of FC income would increase the probability by 2.4%, while the same amount
spent on CH at NP would increase the probability by 4%. CH transfers appear to be
much less stigmatized than FC. This may be a reflection of it being borne by the children
rather than the parent in many cases; or perhaps that it is establishing eligibility for the
initial cash transfer that is stigmatizing and subsequent in-kind transfer participation is
less so
51. Furthermore, most CH recipients (80%) also receive Income Support, and have
lower incomes than FC recipients. Indeed Table 5 shows that CH is more than twice as
responsive as FC participation to level of entitlement.
Labor supply simulations in Table 6 indicate low responsiveness to relative
income differences at both LPT and HPT. Transfers for HPT generally do not reduce FT.
However, extending in-work transfers down to LPT is mainly at the expense of FT. The
last column of Table 6 shows that the unemployment rationing function appears to be
working well. As more women are encouraged to participate, a larger proportion of
individuals are unable to find jobs and become involuntarily unemployed. Misclassifying
this group as voluntary non-participants would bias downwards the labor supply incentive
effects.
Table 7 shows simulations of the labor supply effects of fixed and variable cost
stigma from FC and CH. Essentially the same simulation exercise as in Table 6 is
performed, and the differential incentive effects of FC and CH program income relative to
other income are decomposed. Accounting for variable cost stigma, we simulate 100%
51 Keane and Moffitt (1998) find there are economies to program participation and stigma does not increase
proportionately with the number of programs.30
transfer participation, but allow transfer income to have different utility to other income.
Accounting for fixed cost stigma, we simulate transfer income giving the same utility as
other income, but allow for program non-participation. With both fixed and variable cost
stigma together, the full effect of transfer income is as in Table 6. Without fixed or
variable cost stigma, CH and FC has the same effect as other income on labor supply.
Fixed and variable cost stigma are of about equal importance in explaining the
somewhat weaker incentive effects on labor supply of CH relative to other income.
Whereas for FC, fixed cost stigma explains most of the associated weaker labor supply
incentive effects.
7. Summary and Conclusion
In 1988 UK in-work transfer programs for low income households with children
were reformed: cash transfer entitlements were increased but eligibility to nutrition
programs was removed. This was a partial cash-out of the in-work in-kind transfers while
out-of-work transfers were unchanged.
Here we estimate a model of labor supply and participation in multiple programs
using a sample of lone mothers drawn from repeated cross-section surveys that bridge the
reform. We find that in-work cash and in-work in-kind transfers both have large positive
labor supply effects. There is, however, some utility loss from program participation and
this is larger for cash than for nutrition programs. This implies that the partial cash out of
the in-kind benefits effectively reduced labor supply.
Our findings have several implications for public policy. First, we show that an
increase in transfer entitlements available for part-time work has only a modest impact on
the probability of working part-time, and some impact on wanting (but not being able) to
participate (i.e. unemployment), but such an increase has essentially no adverse effect on31
the probability of full-time work. Expanding transfer entitlements to full-time work has
stronger participation effects. However, increasing the availability of in-work transfers to
those lower down the hours distribution does cause moderate reductions in full-time.
Secondly, we find that nutrition transfers are more important for labor supply
relative to equivalent cash transfers, because of their differential value to recipients since
our estimates imply that nutrition programs suffer from only mild
stigma/transaction/information costs. This is a feature which has not been incorporated in
previous empirical UK labor supply applications and our results suggest that nutrition
transfers may have a useful role to play in promoting work incentives
52. The 1988 partial
cash-out of nutrition transfers in-work is thus shown to have reduced labor supply. Third,
however, we find evidence of statistically significant, and not inconsiderable,
stigma/transaction/information costs which implies that in-work transfers are not as
effective at countering the disincentive effect of out-of-work transfers, or at countering
poverty amongst the working poor, as they might otherwise be. If it were possible to
reduce these costs associated with transfer programs, this would have an important impact
on the labor force non-participation rate for lone mothers, it would imply large savings in
government expenditure on Income Support payments for those not working, and it
would increase the welfare of those in receipt of transfers.
52 There is currently some debate in the UK (particularly, Scotland under their devolved powers) about
reintroducing nutrition program entitlement to families receiving in-work transfers.32
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Appendix Likelihood and implementation
It is convenient in random utility models to parameterize state-dependent variables
with random coefficients in order to capture individual taste heterogeneity. However, for
the purposes of exposition, first we shall ignore the random parameterization and the
existence of state-specific characteristics. This digression to a simpler structure allows us
to write the likelihood as a product of the take-up, rationing and labor supply likelihood
contributions. Essentially this amounts to considering a simpler variance-covariance
matrix
53 and omitting income functions and associated mean parameters from the
likelihood. So the likelihoods presented are first that of a tetranomial probit with full
correlation structure but without random coefficients, and second that of a trivariate
probit.
The full likelihood (with our temporary simplifying assumptions) can be obtained
by combining our latent and observed models with the stochastic assumptions so that
L=LMNP.LMVP where
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53 Without additive terms for the covariance of functions of individual income.37
and where the states 1 through 4 are respectively unrationed: NP, LPT, HPT, FT. State 5
is involuntary unemployment. Φ1 and Φ3 are univariate and trivariate normal cumulative
distribution functions. Similarly
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where P indicates HB, FC and CH. This general notation allows uni-, bi- and trivariate
combinations, φ3 is the trivariate normal probability density function.
Our stochastic specification in the fixed parameter case, in particular the
assumption of no correlation between error terms in take-up and labor supply is quite
restrictive. In the more general case where explanatory functions of income are free to
vary between states, the simultaneous nature of the decision process becomes apparent.
The choice among labor market states is a function of the earned income and transfer
income received in the observed state relative to all others. A program participation
index is estimated from a take-up equation, which depends, among other things, on the
value of the transfer. The difference between this index (a function of size of entitlement
and individual characteristics) in alternative labor market states, is an appropriate way to
incorporate transfer income when program participation is endogenous. To make the link
explicit it is instructive to consider an example of a single likelihood contribution in full,
including random parameters. Let us pick the hypothetical case of a non-participant who
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  where , , , .
HB HB FC FC IK IK
j j j j G Y V V V      Since demographics are alternative-invariant,
these program participation index comparisons come down to differences in functions of
level of entitlement.
Multivariate normal integrals were evaluated numerically using Gaussian
quadrature following Butler and Moffitt (1982). Estimation was in several stages, each
producing starting values for the next. The labor supply and program participation models
were estimated separately without correlation; followed by the simultaneous model
without random parameters; then with random parameters; and then correlations were
introduced. This procedure was robust to different sets of random starting values for the
correlation and variance terms.39
Table 1 Sample Means (Standard Deviations)
Pre April 1988 Post March 1988 All
Own age 35.5 (9.1) 33.1 (8.4) 34.6 (8.9)
# Children aged 0-4 0.37 (0.62) 0.53 (0.69) 0.43 (0.65)
# Children aged 5-10 0.57 (0.73) 0.62 (0.77) 0.59 (0.75)
Prob h=0 0.508 0.573 0.531
H|h>0 26.4 (12.5) 25.3 (13.7) 26.0 (13.0)
# Observations 2906 1621 4527
Table 2 Labor Supply, Transfer Program Eligibility and Participation
Transfer program status Labor market status
Program Receiving Entitled UE NP LPT HPT FT All
FC N N 234 2527 317 228 670 3976
N Y 32 0 0 75 136 243
Y N 4 25 25 16 36 106
Y Y 5 0 0 77 120 202
CH N N 79 539 172 261 769 1820
N Y 35 241 18 25 36 355
Y N 9 114 23 27 79 252
Y Y 152 1658 129 83 78 2100
HB N N 233 2349 260 215 246 3303
N Y 17 87 34 54 175 367
Y N 11 52 21 39 217 340
Y Y 14 64 27 88 324 517
Total 275 2552 342 396 962 4527
Table 3 Labor Supply and Multiple Transfer Receipt
Program participation Labor market status
CH HB FC UE NP LPT HPT FT All
N N N 75 566 93 120 299 1153
N N Y 1 3 4 18 38 64
N Y N 36 207 79 113 402 837
Y N N 154 1717 134 59 54 2118
N Y Y 2 4 14 35 66 121
Y N Y 6 7 2 18 19 52
Y Y N 1 37 11 11 51 111
Y Y Y 0 11 5 22 33 71
275 2552 342 396 962 452740
Table 4 Estimates of Labor Supply, Unemployment and Program Participation
Labor
supply LPT->NP HPT->NP FT->NP Unemployment
Fixed
intercept 0.961 0.188 0.893 0.521 1.085 0.661 -1.040 0.228
renter 0.187 0.028 0.009 0.035 0.046 0.019 0.261 0.039
age -0.043 0.894 -0.269 0.717 -0.963 0.448 -1.805 1.107
age
2 -0.126 1.168 0.261 0.897 1.425 0.662 -0.203 1.468
child 0-4 0.235 0.087 0.487 0.241 0.155 0.067 0.230 0.045
child 5-10 -0.075 0.037 0.046 0.034 0.077 0.036 0.087 0.030
widow -0.147 0.035 0.027 0.040 0.060 0.030 -0.146 0.052
unemp. rate 0.009 0.092
Random Ψ-bar Ψ-tilde
Yother 4.474 0.211 1.049 0.049
Y
FC 0.322 0.154 0.980 0.399
Y
HB 0.008 0.025 0.598 0.400
Y
CH 0.484 0.219 1.000 0.550
Covariance
ρLPT->NP 0.091 0.090 0.445 0.060
ρHPT->NP -0.699 0.092
σ 1.000 - 0.560 0.560 0.232 0.196
Program
participation FC HB CH
intercept -1.055 1.205 -0.469 0.908 0.102 0.572
renter 0.448 0.231 0.626 0.115
age -0.048 0.588 -0.317 0.439 0.019 0.297
age
2 -0.042 0.777 -0.359 0.547 -0.347 0.414
child 0-4 -0.123 0.229 0.232 0.190 0.369 0.125
child 5-10 -0.082 0.156 0.092 0.117 0.089 0.105
widow -1.451 0.664 0.252 0.135 -0.258 0.201
unemp. rate 0.565 0.181 0.459 0.131 -0.008 0.085
Y
p 0.069 0.036 0.279 0.090 0.074 0.005
Covariance
ρCH -0.220 0.154 0.211 0.114
ρFC 0.435 0.123
Note: Standard errors in italics. Log likelihood -6825. Number of observations 4527. The labor supply and
unemployment equations also include 8 region dummies and 7 dummies for consecutive pairs of years.41
Table 5 Program Participation Simulations for a Representative Individual
% expected and expected change by state
Variable Program
CH HB FC
Reference 84.42 40.89 41.61
CH + £10 8.76 0.00 -0.01
HB + £10 0.01 10.75 0.01
FC + £10 0.01 0.01 3.16
owner -19.80 0.00 -13.87
age + 10 -0.35 -1.77 -1.45
unemp. +
1% -0.22 1.85 2.05
child 0-4 7.39 10.12 -5.02
child 5-10 2.19 3.81 -3.14
widow -10.23 -9.48 -25.42
Note: The representative individual has a weekly income (in 1992 prices) of £105, £115, £130, £145 at NP,
LPT, HPT, FT respectively; has zero eligibility for FC, HB or CH; lives in rented accommodation; has a
youngest child at secondary school (aged 11-18); faces a local unemployment rate of 5%; and lives in the
South East in 1992
Table 6 Labor Supply Simulations for a Representative Individual
% expected and expected change by state
Variable Labor supply Ration
NP LPT HPT FT UE
Reference 30.68 8.95 10.82 43.01 6.53
YNP + £10 5.72 -0.01 -0.48 -4.68 -0.54
YLPT + £10 0.04 0.38 -0.05 -0.37 0.00
YHPT + £10 -0.56 -0.05 0.63 -0.07 0.05
YFT + £10 -3.40 -0.35 -0.15 3.57 0.32
CHNP + £10 4.05 -0.04 -0.34 -3.28 -0.38
CHLPT + £10 -0.04 0.27 -0.03 -0.20 0.00
CHHPT + £10 -0.39 -0.03 0.39 -0.01 0.04
CHFT+ £10 -3.56 -0.20 -0.01 3.44 0.34
FCNP + £10 2.43 -0.02 -0.21 -1.97 -0.23
FCLPT + £10 -0.02 0.16 -0.02 -0.12 0.00
FCHPT + £10 -0.23 -0.02 0.23 0.00 0.02
FCFT + £10 -2.15 -0.12 0.00 2.08 0.20
owner -10.30 3.22 0.20 8.83 -1.96
age + 10 -0.13 0.49 0.54 1.07 -1.98
unemp. + 1% 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01
child 0-4 41.40 -2.08 -7.75 -28.62 -2.60
child 5-10 17.54 2.16 -1.36 -17.48 -0.85
widow 13.19 3.87 -0.71 -13.85 -2.50
Note: Representative individual same as for Table 5.42
Table 7 Labor Supply Effects of Stigma and Non-take-up for a representative
individual (% expected by state)
Variable Stigma cost Labor supply Ration
variable fixed NP LPT HPT FT UE
Reference 30.68 8.95 10.82 43.01 6.54
CHNP + £10 Y Y 4.05 -0.04 -0.34 -3.28 -0.39
CHLPT + £10 Y Y -0.04 0.27 -0.03 -0.20 0.00
CHHPT + £10 Y Y -0.39 -0.03 0.39 -0.01 0.04
CHFT + £10 Y Y -3.56 -0.20 -0.01 3.44 0.33
CHNP + £10 Y N 5.83 -0.03 -0.50 -4.75 -0.55
CHLPT + £10 Y N -0.27 0.40 -0.04 -0.12 0.03
CHHPT + £10 Y N -0.91 -0.08 0.71 0.19 0.09
CHFT+ £10 Y N -3.72 -0.39 -0.17 3.93 0.35
CHNP + £10 N Y 5.47 -0.06 -0.46 -4.44 -0.51
CHLPT + £10 N Y -0.05 0.36 -0.04 -0.28 0.01
CHHPT + £10 N Y -0.53 -0.04 0.53 -0.01 0.05
CHFT + £10 N Y -3.62 -0.28 -0.01 3.46 0.45
FCNP+ £10 Y Y 2.43 -0.02 -0.21 -1.97 -0.23
FCLPT + £10 Y Y -0.02 0.16 -0.02 -0.12 0.00
FCHPT + £10 Y Y -0.23 -0.02 0.23 0.00 0.02
FCFT+ £10 Y Y -2.15 -0.12 0.00 2.08 0.19
FCNP + £10 Y N 5.41 0.03 -0.43 -4.50 -0.51
FCLPT + £10 Y N 0.92 0.35 -0.10 -1.08 -0.09
FCHPT + £10 Y N 0.44 0.01 0.42 -0.83 -0.04
FCFT + £10 Y N -2.30 -0.22 -0.12 2.42 0.22
FCNP + £10 N Y 3.52 -0.03 -0.30 -2.86 -0.33
FCLPT + £10 N Y -0.03 0.23 -0.03 -0.18 0.01
FCHPT+ £10 N Y -0.34 -0.03 0.34 -0.01 0.04
FCFT + £10 N Y -3.11 -0.18 -0.01 3.00 0.30
YNP + £10 N N 5.72 -0.01 -0.48 -4.68 -0.55
YLPT + £10 N N 0.04 0.38 -0.05 -0.37 0.00
YHPT + £10 N N -0.56 -0.05 0.63 -0.07 0.05
YFT + £10 N N -3.40 -0.35 -0.15 3.57 0.33
Note: Representative individual same as for table 5.43
Figure 1 Stylized Budget Constraint

































Figure 3 Actual and Predicted Labor Supply